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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


The problems of criminal fiefdoms—alternatively
governed spaces (AGSs) in which criminal organizations,
rather than formal authorities, effectively control the
population and act as the arbiter of internal order—have
become a serious security issue in Latin America. In
several countries, criminal fiefdoms have taken shape
against the backdrop of rampant criminality that has
afflicted much of the region over the past two decades,
with this phenomenon intensified by competition
between rival transnational drug trafficking organizations
(DTOs).



In nations as varied as Guatemala, El Salvador,
Honduras, and Brazil, criminal organizations ranging
from youth gangs to sophisticated DTOs control large
portions of the national territory. They serve as de facto
governments as they collect “taxes” through dues and
extortion, demand the loyalty, or at least the
acquiescence, of the people under their control, and
punish those who interfere with their illicit activities.
Such groups wage irregular warfare—defined as “a
violent struggle among state and non-state actors for
legitimacy and influence
over the
relevant
populations”—against
their
competitors
and
governments.1



While criminal organizations like MS-13 and the First
Capital Command (PCC) of São Paulo sometimes
provide order and limited social services, they also
exploit and terrorize the populace. Criminal fiefdoms
have thus exposed the weakness of governance, showing
that states cannot control their territory or protect their
citizens. This is having a corrosive impact on the public
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psyche, material
democracy.


•

conditions

and

is

undermining

Addressing this problem will be a difficult and complex
task. The issue of criminal fiefdoms is rooted in
structural problems—inequality, lack of opportunity,
corruption, and above all, weak state capacity. Efforts
must concentrate on building broad political compacts in
support of holistic anti-crime programs and efforts to
strengthening the state.
Within this context, there are several initiatives to
consider, including:
 Smarter targeting and efforts to develop tools
necessary to sustain long-term investigations and
successful prosecutions;
 Creative policing strategies that focus on policecivilian interaction and protection of the
population;
 Short and long-term efforts to strengthen honest
law enforcement and judicial officials to reduce
corruption;
 Building the institutional capacity of the agencies
and offices charged with combating and
prosecuting organized crime;
 Macro and micro-economic initiatives to broaden
opportunity and stem the stream of recruits for
organized crime;
 Intensified U.S. efforts to deal with the demand
side of the DTO problem and a capacity and
willingness for innovation and experimentation.
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INTRODUCTION
During the Cold War, Latin America was roiled by Marxist
insurgencies that, in the process of seeking to overthrow
governments, carved out “liberated zones” in which
insurgents could operate freely and extract resources from
the population. Today, ideological violence has faded, but
the problem of alternatively governed spaces (AGSs)—areas
in which some groups other than the government are the de
facto arbiter of internal order—continues to plague the
region. A variety of criminal organizations, ranging from
youth gangs to transnational drug-trafficking organizations
(DTOs), have established “criminal fiefdoms” in which they
operate with little or no interference from the authorities and
have established a form of dominance—complete with
“taxation,” limited social services, and often-brutal
punishment—over the population. This phenomenon is
most pronounced in Central American countries like
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador, but it is also evident
in Brazil. Where fiefdoms exist, states are essentially
experiencing irregular warfare, as criminal groups compete
with established governments for control and influence over
the civilian population. This phenomenon has highlighted
the weakness of many states, and is having a severely
corrosive impact on democratic governance and the rule of
law.
This paper thus analyzes the origins, manifestations, and
ramifications of the problem of criminal fiefdoms. The first
section offers an analytical framework for understanding the
issue. The second and third sections present case studies,
focusing on the current situation in Guatemala and São
Paulo, Brazil.
The fourth section discusses policy
implications.
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CRIME, THIRD-GENERATION GANGS, AND
IRREGULAR WARFARE IN LATIN AMERICA
The problem of AGSs has always plagued Latin America.
Since the emergence of modern Latin American states in the
early 19th century, a variety of factors—namely
underdeveloped state capacity and deep socio-economic and
ethnic cleavages—have left governments vulnerable to
internal disorder and, at times, deprived them of control over
parts of the national territory. During the Cold War, for
instance, the Marxist insurgencies that took hold throughout
Latin America established “liberated zones.” In countries
like Guatemala, El Salvador, and Colombia, these zones
eventually came to encompass large swaths of the
countryside. Rebel groups used these areas as bases and
staging grounds, and within these areas it was guerrillas—
rather than the government—that ruled. In some cases, this
“governance” took the form of implementing measures
designed to win the loyalties of communities marginalized
by government, such as building clinics and schools. In
other cases, guerrilla governance focused more on resource
extraction, and involved compelling people to provide labor,
military service, or “donations” of money and supplies.
Those who did not show sufficient enthusiasm for the
guerrilla cause were frequently executed as “traitors.”2
Notwithstanding the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia), the problem of AGSs is not mainly a function of
ideological conflict, but rather a by-product of the wave of
criminal activity that has swept the region over the last 20
years. Since the end of the Cold War, a variety of factors
have left the region vulnerable to crime and violence, such as
porous borders, extensive illegal economic flows, and
access to guns. Endemic corruption and weak state
institutions are giving criminal organizations significant
2
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leeway to operate. Widespread poverty and social alienation
ensure a steady supply of young recruits, and densely packed
urban slums give them near-impenetrable havens in which to
operate. The deportation of tens of thousands of criminals
from the U.S. over the past 15 years has effectively
overwhelmed law enforcement capacity in countries like
Guatemala.3
Across the region, an array of criminal groups—international
drug traffickers, violent youth gangs, and organized crime
syndicates—have thus largely replaced Marxist rebels as the
chief purveyors of disorder. These groups have carved out
niches in a variety of illicit activities—drug smuggling,
human trafficking, arms dealing, kidnapping, robbery,
extortion, and money laundering—and made insecurity a fact
of life. Latin America regularly competes for the title of most
violent region in the world (in terms of homicides), and its
youth murder rate was more than twice as high as that of any
other region in 2008. In some Central American countries,
violence is approaching levels last seen during the civil wars
of the 1970s and 1980s. Even where murder levels are lower,
violence and crime have driven down economic activity,
fostered widespread fear, and made life miserable for much
of the population.4
There is no single model of organized crime. Some criminal
groups are relatively small street gangs that are involved
mainly in petty robbery, small-scale extortion and drug
trafficking, and the occasional murder for hire. At the other
3

Max Manwaring, A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty:
Gangs and Other Illicit Transnational Criminal Organizations in Central
America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil (Carlisle Barracks,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007), passim; also Vanda Felbab-Brown,
“Tackling Transnational Crime: Adapting U.S. National Security
Policy,” Brookings Institution, July 18, 2008.
4
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Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, “Youth, Violence, and Democracy,” Current
History, February 2007, pp. 64-69.
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end of the spectrum are sophisticated, multi-tiered
organizations that operate in several cities or even on a
transnational basis. Gangs like the Mara Salvatrucha (MS13) in Central America and the First Capital Command
(PCC) in Brazil, as well as paramilitary groups like Los
Zetas in Mexico, have hundreds, thousands, or even tens of
thousands of members organized into numerous cells and
overseen by a centralized hierarchy. They employ
individuals ranging from hit men to accountants and lawyers,
who occupy key nodes in illicit networks. With different
divisions and sub-divisions responsible for specific activities
some criminal groups actually resemble corporations.
Some analysts refer to these groups as “third-generation
gangs,” because they represent the highest evolution of
organized crime in Latin America.5 These gangs use a
mixture of violence and corruption to neutralize governments
and protect their business; they employ a variety of
weapons—heavy machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades,
improvised explosive devices, sniper rifles, and crude
armored vehicles—and strike with astounding brazenness
and savagery. What the gangs are doing, in essence, is
seeking to intimidate the state and the citizenry into
submission and win a free hand in pursuing lucrative illicit
business dealings. 6 In addition to violence, corruption plays
an integral role in undermining state institutions. Criminals
have long used the formula of plata o plomo (money or lead)
to corrupt government officials; third-generation gangs have
become masters of this strategy. Confronted with the choice
of an easy payout or a violent death, law enforcement
frequently opts for the former. Gangs are thus not just

5

John P. Sullivan, “Transnational Gangs: The Impact of Third
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battering the state from without; they are also weakening it
from within.7
Across the region, gangs like the PCC, MS-13, and the Zetas
have taken this approach to the logical next step, using
violence to carve out geographic areas where government is
essentially powerless to intervene. In areas of Mexico,
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Brazil, gang violence has
become so intense and gang influence so pervasive that
authorities have largely retreated. Gangs use these areas as
free zones for drug trafficking, arms smuggling, human
trafficking, and other illegal activities, and exert their own
form of governance. They lay down a code of conduct,
specifying which activities are allowed. Those who comply
with this code are generally rewarded with protection as well
as limited social services like food, toys, and clothing—the
allure of which is not to be underestimated in impoverished
areas where the population has long been slighted by the
state. Those who do not comply are punished/ killed.8
From an analytical perspective, it is clear that many Latin
American countries are beset by irregular warfare. The 2007
Joint Operating Concept defines irregular warfare (IW) as “a
violent struggle among state and non-state actors for
legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations.” IW
favors “indirect and asymmetric approaches,” and frequently
involves groups—transnational criminal enterprises,
insurgents, terrorists—who use innovative, unconventional
7

Jose de Cordoba and David Luhnow, “Mexican Officials Allege Drug
Cartel Infiltrated Attorney General‟s Office,” Wall Street Journal,
October 28, 2008; “Drug Charges for Guatemala Tsar,” BBC News,
November 16, 2005; Luis Esteban G. Manrique, “A Parallel Power:
Organized Crime in Latin America,” Real Instituto Elcano de Estudios
Internacionales y Estratégicos, September 28, 2006,
www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/1049.asp.
8
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tactics to overwhelm a stronger foe. As a result, IW resides
in the “grey area” between accepted typologies of conflict. It
is a “complex, „messy‟ and ambiguous social phenomenon
that does not lend itself to clean, neat, concise, or precise
definition.” While some analysts might object to the use of
military vocabulary to describe criminal activity, this
description—with all the nuance and even ambiguity that it
implies—accurately describes the regional security
challenges posed by AGSs .9
Because of this complexity, IW can be very difficult. It
requires the threatened government to synchronize police
and military programs, and to combine security initiatives
with a variety of additional projects—intelligence, social
reform, institution-building, and economic development,
etc.—aimed at ameliorating the conditions that allow
criminals to thrive. Given that the armed forces have
historically been used against the citizenry, there is often
strong resistance to involving the military in domestic
security matters, even when the police are clearly
overwhelmed. Criminal insurgency in AGSs thus poses a
severe test for regional governments, with fledgling
democracies struggling to formulate an adequate response.
The remainder of this paper examines four such cases:
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, and the role played
by the PCC in São Paulo, Brazil.
GANGS, DTOS, AND THE CRISIS IN GUATEMALA
Guatemala has suffered a wave of violent crime during the
last two decades, and has been continually plagued by
corruption, institutional debility, and inequality while
struggling with drug trafficking and the legacy of a brutal
three-decade civil war. Murder levels skyrocketed over the

9
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past decade, reaching 108 per 100,000 inhabitants (compared
to a world average of less than 9 per 100,000).10
The problem of AGSs is manifest in two distinct types of
geographical areas in Guatemala—marginal urban barrios
afflicted by a heavy gang presence, and outlying areas where
a government presence is weak and drug-trafficking
pervasive. With respect to the former, the gang problem in
Guatemala had its origins in the civil war, as displaced and
uneducated—but often well-armed—young people turned to
crime. This phenomenon subsequently received a major
boost from destabilizing refugee flows, particularly the
deportation of Guatemalan émigrés-turned-gang members
from Southern California in the U.S.
Gangs like MS-13 and 18th Street (M-18) are at the center of
the crime epidemic. Smaller gangs (pandillas) focus on
petty extortion, robbery, small-scale drug trafficking, and,
occasionally, kidnapping and murder. Larger, transnational
gangs (maras) use international connections to participate in
arms smuggling, human trafficking, large-scale auto theft,
racketeering, and other organized crimes.11 Gangs are
intensely territorial; they seek to control swaths of urban
territory to maximize profits from drug distribution and
collect “taxes” in the form of extortion from local business
owners and residents. In the case of the pandillas, areas may
be as small as a couple of square blocks; in the case of the
10

Kevin Casas-Zamora, “Guatemalastan: How to Prevent a Failed State
in Our Midst,” Brookings Institution, May 22, 2009,
www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/0522_guatemala_casaszamora.aspx,
accessed June 2, 2009; Michael Deibert, “Guatemala‟s Death Rattle:
Drugs vs. Democracy,” World Policy Journal, Vol. 25, No. 4, Winter
2008/2009, pp. 167-168.
11
Good summaries of gang activity include Federico Brevé, “The Maras:
A Menace to the Americas,” Military Review, July 2007, pp. 91-92;
Thomas Bruneau, “The Maras and National Security in Central
America,” Strategic Insights, May 2005,
www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/May/bruneauMay05.pdf, accessed July 22,
2009.
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maras, entire neighborhoods are at stake. To achieve
dominance, gangs use a blend of tactics. They offer money,
food, and other goods to residents who accept their rule,
providing a social safety net that has long been absent in
Guatemala. Gangs also offer an alternative to relying on a
corrupt, ineffective police force, and provide protection for
members and citizens who accept their rule, and intervene—
albeit brutally and summarily—in disputes between residents
of their fiefdoms. In effect, those who show loyalty to the
predominant gang can avail themselves of services that the
Guatemalan government has long failed to provide. 12 Yet it
would be a mistake to glamorize the role the gangs play in
providing order, because they rely heavily on violence and
terror. El Flaco, a member of MS-13, explains the ruthless
methods by which the gang extorts money and eliminates
resistance to its power: “We have a saying: If you don‟t pay,
we won‟t hurt the father; sadly, it‟s the children who‟ll
pay…We send them a letter…We ask for $5,000 to $13,000,
depending on the kind of business he‟s in. If he doesn‟t pay,
we kidnap his wife or a child, and we kill them. Then we
send him body parts showing him we mean business, and we
keep kidnapping family members until he pays.” 13
As gang competition has intensified, they frequently seek to
shock the population into submission. One detailed study
(2004) reports that, “initiation into the 18th Street Gang
required the rape, disfiguration, and murder of a young
woman.”14 The way gangs use violence to cement their
12

Author‟s Interview with USAID Official, 24 November 2009; Diana
Villiers Negroponte, The Merida Initiative and Central America: The
Challenges of Containing Public Insecurity and Criminal Violence,
Working Paper Number 3, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, May
2009, passim.
13
John Burnett, “Private Assassins Target Gangs in Guatemala,”
National Public Radio, December 22, 2008,
www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=98593139, accessed
July 22, 2009.
14
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control of a given territory is evident in another favored
tactic—attacking the heavily used bus systems in Guatemala
City and other urban centers. The gang that dominates a
certain bus route normally charges around $13 per day for
the right to transit the zone unmolested; drivers who refuse
to pay are murdered. In addition, gangs occasionally conduct
widespread, simultaneous attacks on transportation
infrastructure. In 2008, 255 bus drivers and their assistants
were murdered across the nation.15
These tactics have had an immense impact in a country
where the government is widely seen as corrupt,
incompetent, or some combination of the two. The police
are undermanned and underfunded, compounding the issue
of corruption and allowing the gangs to establish virtual free
zones in numerous barrios. One of these barrios—El
Gallito—is located only a couple of miles from the
presidential palace in the capital. As of 2008, local gang
leaders have dominated El Gallito.16 This problem is even
worse in the rural areas, where competition between rival
DTOs has intensified as Guatemala has assumed an
expanded role in the inter-American drug trade. During the
1980s, Colombian cartels dominated the drug trade, often
cooperating with corrupt military officials to move cocaine,
marijuana, and heroin shipments northward. After these
organizations—particularly the Cali and Medellín cartels—
were dismantled in the early 1990s, Mexico‟s Sinaloa cartel
stepped in. Since 2005, Los Zetas have begun to assert their
own claim over the Guatemalan drug trade. The Zetas are
moving south to extend greater control over their supply
network, and to find sanctuary at a time when the Mexican
government has launched an all-out offensive against DTOs.
15

Samuel Lowenberg, “Street Gangs Target and Kill Bus Drivers in
Guatemala,” WorldFocus, March 30, 2009; “Guatemalan Bus Drivers on
Strike to Protest Murders,” Latin American Herald Tribune, March 17,
2009; Mariela Castañon, “Siguen los ataques en autobuses,” La Hora,
October 28, 2009.
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According to one official in the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), the Zetas are seeking to “reach out
into Guatemala, extend their operation into Guatemala, and
take over the Guatemala corridor.”17
For drug traffickers, as for youth gangs, controlling areas
where organizations can operate free from government
interference is a crucial operational imperative. In recent
years, these efforts have focused on a number of outlying
areas, especially those—such as Huehuetenango and Petén—
with frontage on the Mexican border. Dense vegetation and
a limited government presence impedes effective
surveillance of these areas, and groups like the Zetas,
Sinaloa, and local drug traffickers have all sought to
construct bases of operations in these regions. Traffickers
have been particularly active in constructing clandestine
runways—crude airstrips where cocaine and other drugs are
flown in from Colombia and subsequently broken into
smaller shipments to be sent across the border—to the point
that, as of several years ago, there were nearly 500 such
airstrips in Guatemala.18 In rural areas, traffickers are
accumulating private property. Ranches and farms are
sought as safe havens from the police (or competitors) and as
depots where drugs and arms can be stored. In most cases,
traffickers seek to purchase properties initially, but if
resistance is met, they resort to intimidation or force.19
DTOs consolidate their influence in these zones through the
usual mix of corruption and violence.
Local and
17

Author‟s Telephone Interview with DEA official, November 23, 2009.
Stephen Johnson, “Guatemala‟s Drug Crime Challenge: How We Can
Help it Cope,” Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, June 9, 2009;
“Statement of Rogelio E. Guevara, Chief of Operations, Drug
Enforcement Administration, Before House Committee on International
Relations, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, October 10, 2002.
19
“Narcos obligan a finqueros a venderles sus propiedades,” Prensa
Libre, December 7, 2008.
18
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departmental officials who decline to tolerate (or participate
in) trafficking have been murdered, often in brutal fashion.
DTO operatives are also believed to have been behind a
recent assassination attempt against the governor of Petén.20
According to the U.S. State Department, “money from the
drug trade has woven itself into the fiber of Guatemalan law
enforcement and justice institutions.”21 The cartels pay
small-town mayors for the right to set up clandestine
airstrips, and bribe judges, police commanders, military
officials, and border guards to avoid government
surveillance or prosecution.22 It is estimated that up to 40
percent of Guatemalan territory is either contested or
effectively beyond the control of the government. 23 In the
case of corruption and violence, each has intensified due to
competition between the Zetas and their rivals. The Zetas,
initially formed by Mexican special-forces deserters, have
advanced training in intelligence, counter-insurgency,
complex assaults, and other techniques. As of mid-2009, the
group had an estimated 300-400 operatives in Guatemala.
The group has established training camps, arms depots, and
drug caches in regions that border Mexico, and Guatemalan
officials estimate that the Zetas have a presence in 75 percent
of the country.24

20

“Guatemalan Governor Emerges Unscathed from Attack,” Latin
American Herald Tribune, August 2, 2009.
21
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23
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16, 2009.
24
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The Zetas ruthlessly target their competitors as well as
officials thought to support rival DTOs. In March 2008, a
firefight in Zacapa between the Zetas and Guatemalan
traffickers claimed 11 lives. In late 2008, another shootout
involving the Zetas, this time in Huehuetenango, left 17
dead. According to press reports, the fighting was so intense
that police and military units had to wait for the combatants
to exhaust themselves before moving in. 25 The government
simply cannot compete with well-armed, well-funded DTOs.
Guatemala has a single, national police force (the National
Civil Police), and its outposts in rural areas are too often
small, isolated, and undermanned. Police side arms (many
of which are reportedly defective) are no match for
fragmentation grenades, automatic weapons, armor-piercing
ammunition, and rocket launchers.
AGSs are having a devastating effect on the national psyche.
According to a study conducted by USAID, “86 percent of
Guatemalans surveyed feel that the level of insecurity facing
Guatemala presents a threat to the future well-being of the
country, and 45 percent feel that insecurity poses a threat to
their own personal security.” 26
According to
Latinobarómetro, only 8 percent of Guatemalans think that
democracy works better in their country than in the rest of
Latin America, the lowest figure in the region. 27 Insecurity
is giving voice to authoritarian sentiments. According to a
2004 USAID study, “Guatemalans cite crime, along with
corruption, as one of their top concerns and high levels of
crime [are] cited as the top justification for a military coup.”
Such sentiments are evident in the explosion of private
25

Quoted in Author‟s Telephone Interview with DEA official, November
23, 2009; Mariela Castañón, “Autoridades explican balacera en Santa
Ana Huista, Huehuetenango,” La Hora, December 1, 2008; “Narcos
mexicanos retan poder de mafias locales,” Prensa Libre, December 2,
2008.
26
USAID, Central America and Mexico Gang Assessment: Annex 2:
Guatemala Country Profile.
27
Latinobarómetro, Informe 2008, pp. 91, 103.
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security personnel employed in Guatemala, as well as the
upsurge in vigilante violence against suspected criminals.
Both of these trends have provided affluent Guatemalans
with some measure of security, but they have also
underscored the fact that the state has lost its monopoly on
the legitimate use of force.28
It is not simply Guatemalans that will suffer the
consequences if this trend continues. The emergence of
AGSs, particularly those dominated by DTOs, would impede
U.S. counter-narcotics operations in Central America and
make the restoration of order in Mexico all the more difficult
by providing DTOs with a cross-border sanctuary. Just as
troubling, the continued weakness of the Guatemalan state
would set a terrible precedent in a region where
representative government remains fragile, and numerous
countries are facing the same type of threat from organized
crime and internal violence.
CRIMINAL FIEFDOMS AND CONTESTED SPACES IN
EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS
For much of the past decade, the problem of criminal
fiefdoms in El Salvador and Honduras was primarily a
function of gang activity. In El Salvador, for instance, it has
been estimated (2006-2007) that the maras controlled at least
15 municipalities.29 This phenomenon is primarily to be
found in marginal urban areas such as Soyapango, an
extremely poor section of San Salvador. As one reporter has
remarked, “The slum called Soyapango… is a big step down
from even the worst L.A. housing projects. The corrugated
iron shacks have no running water. There are flies and rats.
28

Richard L. Millett, “Crime and Citizen Security: Democracy‟s Achilles
Heel,” in Millet, Jennifer Holmes, and Orlando Pérez, eds., Latin
American Democracy: Emerging Reality or Endangered Species, New
York: Rutledge, 2008, p. 255; USAID, Central America and Mexico
Gang Assessment: Annex 2: Guatemala Country Profile.
29
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Sewage runs through the streets.”30 For several years
Soyapango has been the site of conflict between MS-13 and
M-18, both of which have thousands of members. The
results were gang-on-gang violence, “collateral damage,”
and the eventual division of Soyapango and its constituent
neighborhoods into areas dominated by one gang or another.
In 2007, one assessment reported that, “rival gangs have
carved up this San Salvador suburb into home turfs where
they rule through extortion, armed robbery, and homicide.”31
Both MS-13 and M-18 have sought to consolidate their
control of these neighborhoods and extract resources from
residents. Bus drivers are taxed if they wish to transit the
area and killed if they refuse to pay, resulting in periodic
stoppages of bus service in the area; and gang members
demand that businesses pay a “war tax” to fund criminal
operations and provide them with a steady cash flow.32
There are reports that some longtime community members
receive a measure of respect from the maras and have made
peace with gangs. One resident commented that, “Now there
is a kind of truce with the community members, who have
decided not to go to the police … perhaps because of this …
they leave us alone.”33 The price of peace is acquiescence,
and the gangs continue to extort money. 34 In some cases, the
maras have taken to using extreme violence in an attempt to
recruit members and extract labor from residents. In 2008,
an eight-year old child was apparently shot in retaliation for
refusing to join a gang. To escape these problems—as well
30

“Central America Imports Crime from U.S.” Washington Times, 17
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31
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as associated issues like the rape of young women—families
that can afford to have taken to leaving Soyapango in search
of a less precarious existence. According to one report,
around 300 families fled Soyapango in 2004 alone.35
Even the police find that they have immense difficulties
operating in places like Soyapango. While mareros are
sometimes reluctant to murder on-duty police officers (who
can shoot back), they have shown no hesitation in killing offduty officers (who usually do not carry guns). Because
many officers come from poor communities and live in the
areas where they work, they face a substantial disincentive to
undertake any type of assertive action against the gangs.
Those who do can be “green lighted,” meaning that any gang
member who comes upon that particular individual is
authorized to kill him. This dynamic has deeply
compromised police operations. According to one affidavit:
“The gangs have become so powerful that some police
officers do not interfere with the maras‟ criminal activities."
Some officers will give warning to the gangs about a
particular raid, for example. In this way, some police can
survive in gang neighborhoods… Police officers are forced
to decide whether they want to follow their duties as officers,
or whether they want to protect their lives, become corrupt
and collaborate with the gang.” 36 In many cases, they opt for
the latter.
The situation is similar in a number of Honduran
municipalities, where gangs use violence in an effort to
reinforce control of territory or dissuade aggressive
government countermeasures.
In 2003, for instance,
presumed M-18 members in San Pedro Sula viciously killed
several young women in what was apparently a response to
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government efforts to convince the mareros to disband.37 A
year later, MS-13 members in Chamalecon stopped a bus
traveling through their territory. They proceeded to murder
28 passengers. The attack was aimed at underscoring the
gang‟s power. As Ana Arana relates, “The slaughter had
nothing to do with the identities of the people onboard; it
was meant as a protest and a warning against the
government‟s crackdown on gang activities in the
country.”38
As in the case of Guatemala, the prevalence of contested
areas and criminally-controlled AGSs have increased as
Central America has taken on a larger part in the interAmerican drug trade. Located between South America and
the U.S. and characterized by dense terrain and weak
governments, El Salvador and Honduras have become
attractive targets for the DTOs. Mexican traffickers have
long had cooperative relationships with the maras, but now
they seem to be making efforts to establish a more direct
presence. The Zetas and the Sinaloa cartel are rumored to
have begun setting up bases along the Honduran coast and in
the rugged interior. They use these bases, as well as farms
that they have purchased, as depots for drug shipments and
arms caches.39 DTOs have also begun to set up clandestine
airstrips and have bribed and threatened officials in order to
carve out greater room to operate. In one recent counternarcotics operation in Honduras, the State Department writes
37
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that, “clandestine airstrips hidden in thick vegetation were
discovered, and ammunition, aviation fuel, food, and lighting
equipment were confiscated. This semi-permanent camp was
linked to multiple recurring illegal flights and used
international organized crime as a very important point for
the transshipment of drugs.” 40 DTOs are thus pushing deeper
into Central America, acquiring control over strategically
valuable territory.
As they do, competition between DTOs is becoming more
intense and problematic. In April 2010, the massacre of nine
people in Tegucigalpa was linked to competition between
Mexican organizations. “These deaths were provoked by
territorial disputes between drug traffickers,” the
Tegucigalpa police chief asserted.41 Similarly, there are
reports that the Zetas have sought to have the Honduran
security minister murdered, and the country‟s top
counternarcotics official was killed in what appeared to be a
drug-related hit in 2009.42.
“THE STATE IS NOW THE PRISONER OF THE PCC”—
GANG GOVERNANCE IN BRAZIL
The problem of AGSs is not limited to Central America and
Mexico, but is also a problem for a country not normally
associated with this group of nations—Brazil. Even as
Brazil‟s major cities have become centers of global business
and finance, powerful criminal groups dominate Brazil‟s
numerous slums and prisons.
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The mega-gangs that dominate urban life in Brazil‟s major
cities were, in most cases, born in overcrowded prisons, and
represent a fusion of criminal expediency with the tactics and
left-wing ideology of urban guerrilla groups that operated
during the 1960s and 1970s. Most originated as relatively
small groups dedicated to protecting members in prison, and
subsequently gained a wider following by calling for
improved prison conditions. As these groups became more
powerful, they tapped into a wide array of illicit networks—
drug trafficking especially—and began to spread their
influence beyond prison walls and into slums where state
control was weak. To appeal to disenchanted slum-dwellers,
these gangs wrapped themselves in slogans touting the need
for social justice and economic redistribution.43
The most notorious—and most powerful—criminal
organization is the First Capital Command (PCC), which
operates in the state of São Paulo under the motto, “Liberty,
Justice, and Peace.”44 The PCC is now thought to command
the allegiance—or at least the obedience—of perhaps 90
percent of the well over 100,000+ prisoners in that state, as
well as tens of thousands of members beyond prison walls.
Since its founding, the PCC has branched out considerably,
and now plays a strong role in a variety of criminal
enterprises—car theft, extortion, arms trafficking,
kidnapping, and bank robbery. As Brazil has became a
major consumer of cocaine, the PCC has also claimed a
leadership role in cocaine trafficking and distribution,
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forging alliances
Paraguay.45

with

groups

from

Colombia

and

The PCC protects its enterprises through a variety of
activities meant to give it latitude from the oversight and
interference of state authorities. Aside from corrupting large
numbers of government officials, the PCC has worked to
create safe havens where its members are nearly immune to
the actions of the police or other government authorities.
This strategy was honed in the prison system, where the PCC
established virtual states-within-a-state during the 1990s.
The PCC laid down a strict code of conduct for its members
and collected “taxes” in the form of mandatory dues. As the
PCC‟s growing numbers and reputation for ruthlessness
made it more powerful, it began to regulate nearly all aspects
of prison life; for example, conjugal visits, payment of debts,
allotment of cells and bunks, and the distribution of drugs
and contraband. “Cleaners” ran and continue to run cellblocks as their own personal fiefdoms, and their permission
is apparently still required if one inmate seeks to murder
another in retribution for an unpaid debt or other injury. 46
PCC rule brought drawbacks and benefits for the prison
population. Arbitrary violence became less common, and
the imposition of some semblance of order had a mitigating
effect on overcrowding and unsanitary conditions. Yet the
45
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PCC regularly used violence, murdering its rivals and those
who refused to acknowledge its supremacy. During one riot
in 2005, the PCC beheaded five rival gang members and
placed their heads on pikes to be displayed before news
cameras.47 As the PCC has expanded, it has steadily moved
into the favelas that make up much of São Paulo. This
expansion was undertaken to give the PCC control of drug
distribution in the growing market, and also to find new
sources of revenue. The impoverished favelas have proven
fertile ground for fostering PCC influence and power. Often
built on the sides of hills, the favelas are characterized by
dense urban terrain that is a nightmare for the police.
Equally important, the slums are populated by poor residents
who have traditionally seen little in the way of attention or
benefits from the formal government.48
The PCC runs São Paulo‟s favelas much as it runs the
prisons. “Pilots” are charged with overseeing gang activities
in several municipalities, making them the de facto authority
for up to several hundred thousand citizens. The PCC
dominates drug trafficking, armed robbery, and other
criminal activities in these areas, and as in the prisons, it has
laid down a code of conduct by which the residents are
expected to follow. Crimes committed by non-members are
summarily punished, and victims of rape, robbery, or other
crimes can petition PCC leaders for recourse. Non-affiliated
criminals are expected to coordinate their activities with the
PCC leadership, and to offer part of the take as tribute. To
foster goodwill, the PCC often undertakes the exemplary
punishment of neighborhood nuisances and throws parties or
distributes money or food to area residents.49
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The PCC thus functions as a crude form of government, but
it can also be incredibly brutal in enforcing its dominance.
PCC operatives have extorted money from local businesses
in order to fund criminal endeavors, and they have attacked
police stations and other symbols of government power. For
example, the PCC mounted 44 attacks in November and
December 2003, and in January 2006, launched a two-day
series of attacks against São Paulo police. The group is also
apparently responsible for dozens of bombings of public
buildings, and there are reports that its members have
contracted private security personnel to provide instruction
in the use of advanced weapons. In effect, the PCC is
seeking to convince the state that it is better off allowing the
gang to operate unhindered.50 Indeed, the PCC has
demonstrated a willingness to use hostages. In 2006, when a
prison superintendent refused a series of escalating demands
and sought to transfer some 765 PCC members to a new
facility, the PCC embarked on a five-day binge of attacks
that threw South America‟s largest city into chaos. One
Brazilian military analyst described the situation as “a week
in Baghdad.”
Pistols, rifles, machine guns, and hand
grenades were used by those involved. In a
coordinated series of attacks, carried out with
military precision, 293 assaults took place on
police stations, patrols, road checkpoints,
stores, justice courts, 17 banks, and other
establishments. Some 215 hostages were
taken in 80 prison riots across the states of
São Paulo, Paraná, Mato Grosso do Sul, and
Bahia and also in the federal capital, Brasília.
Eighty-two public transport busses were
burned and a metro station was attacked
causing chaos for an estimated 6 million
50
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workers in the city and the state of São Paulo.
A total of 161 people were killed, including
41 policemen (most of them military) and
prison guards, 107 gang members, 9 rebelling
prisoners, and 4 civilians ….51
Although 4,000 military police were deployed, the attacks
demonstrated that the PCC was a dominant force, and that
order would be maintained only with PCC willingness. As
one Brazilian security official puts it, “….the state is now the
prisoner of the PCC.”52
The activities of the PCC have laid bare the fundamental
weakness of the state and underscored the inequality that
pervades Brazilian society—the rich can purchase protection
and live in gated communities, while the poor are left to their
fate. If the government cannot address these problems, they
may come to constitute a drag on the country‟s geopolitical
ascent.
Many citizens are already asking why the
government should devote more resources to activities
abroad when it cannot even control its own cities, a
sentiment echoed by presidential candidate José Serra in
2010.53
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In Guatemala, Brazil, El Salvador, and Honduras, rampant
criminality
and
competition
between
criminal
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organizations—particularly
transnational
DTOs—is
manifesting itself in the rise of criminal fiefdoms. In these
spaces, official governance has largely given way to the rule
of groups that use a mixture of inducement and brutality to
co-opt or intimidate citizens, neutralize opponents and
governments, and win a free hand in managing illicit
activities. Beyond having socio-economic consequences,
this trend has illustrated the political shortcomings of Latin
American states and thrown the credibility of governments
into doubt.
What might a solution to this problem look like? While the
issue of criminal fiefdoms is alarming in its own right, it
cannot be divorced from the broader wave of crime that has
swept Latin America in the past two decades, nor can it be
separated from the social, economic, and political conditions
that have enabled this rampant criminality. Crime in the
region is rooted in a combination of structural influences
including corruption, inequality, and a lack of legitimate
opportunities for at-risk populations. Underlying all of these
problems is the weakness of the state. The strength of
entrenched elites has long kept tax revenues low in Latin
America, making it difficult for governments to carry out the
functions and provide services—law and order, decent
education, an honest and professional bureaucracy—
normally associated with effective democratic governance.
The lack of tax revenue has long crippled the administrative
capacity and performance of Latin American governments. 54
Viewing the criminal fiefdom phenomenon solely from a law
enforcement perspective provides an incomplete analysis.
Just as experts on counter-insurgency and IW emphasize the
need to embed the use of force in a large scheme of military
and non-military programs, efforts to address this problem
must therefore deal with both its symptoms and its
54
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underlying causes.
This reality indicates that regional
governments will have to overcome—or at least mitigate—a
variety of entrenched challenges if they are to make
meaningful progress in tackling the issue of AGSs. A
combination of the problems noted above has frustrated
efforts to weaken the power of criminal organizations in
Latin America.
There are, however, examples of countries breaking free of
these constraints and forging a holistic approach to
strengthening governance and the rule of law. Between 2002
and 2010, Alvaro Uribe leveraged the disillusion of the
Colombian electorate to forge a national compact that
allowed him not simply to wage an offensive against the
FARC and its allies, but also to combat corruption and
strengthen the Colombian state. Since 2006, Felipe Calderon
of Mexico has sought to emulate this model, though his
ultimate success in doing so remains to be seen.55 Going
forward, the task for regional leaders will thus be to forge the
broad political accords necessary to build tax revenues,
strengthen the state‟s administrative capacity, combat
corruption and socio-economic exclusion, and improve the
capabilities of the forces of order.
Within this context, there are several categories of programs
that will be integral in any strategy to reduce the power of
criminal organizations. With respect to the most visible
aspects
of
anti-crime
initiatives—security
and
enforcement—a central imperative is to work toward smarter
targeting that improves the quality—not the quantity—of
arrests. Many countries take a broad-gauge approach to
55
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dealing with organized crime, focusing on so-called mano
dura policies that seek simply to incarcerate as many
suspected gang members as possible.56 A more effective
approach would be to target leadership elements and
operatives who provide special skills and services. Doing so
not only entails leveraging existing intelligence
capabilities—those of the home country and U.S. agencies—
it also means engaging with academics, gang experts, and
former criminals who are able to map vulnerabilities in gang
and DTO hierarchies. As one DEA official states, “To get
the greatest bang for your buck, you have to rely on your
intelligence network.”57 Similarly, it will be necessary to
help governments develop anti-money-laundering and asset
confiscation regimes so that they can attack the finances of
criminal organizations, as well as witness protection
programs and other capabilities crucial to long-term
investigations and successful prosecutions. U.S. agencies
have considerable experience in capacity building, and such
efforts with several governments have yielded results.58
A second imperative is to experiment with and refine
creative policing techniques that can be used to break the
grip of criminal organizations on densely populated urban
environments. In Central America, U.S. agencies have
sponsored professional exchanges and other programs that
promote community-policing strategies and other efforts
designed to immerse the police in the population, yielding
greater cooperation and intelligence. In Brazil, various state
56
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police agencies have adopted counter-insurgency style
strategies in dealing with the favelas, emphasizing the need
for police officials to live among the population and establish
a permanent presence.59 The wisdom of these particular
policies has been heavily debated, but these initiatives do
represent the type of unconventional thinking needed to deal
with an irregular threat like criminal fiefdoms.
Aggressive policing, in turn, will be effective only if carried
out and supported by honest, competent professionals.
Because addressing current deficiencies in police and
judicial institutions will be a long-term process, it makes
sense to take a two-tiered approach. First, U.S. and Latin
American officials should identify the pockets of
trustworthy, courageous public servants and augment the
capabilities of these groups, building a small core of
professional officials. The U.S. possesses several tools that
can be useful in this regard: personnel exchanges with U.S.
law enforcement agencies to promote a culture of
professionalism, interaction with U.S. police officers familiar
with community policing techniques, assistance in the
training and vetting of small, elite forces that will be needed
to carry out sensitive operations, and support for offices
charged with monitoring official performance and
prosecuting corrupt officials.60
Over the long term, more thoroughgoing institutional reform
will be necessary to improve the performance of the police,
judiciary, and other institutions charged with upholding law
and order. As U.S. officials and NGOs operating in
Guatemala and elsewhere have discovered, making progress
59
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on these issues requires taking a bottom-up approach to
institutional reform—training or re-training officials,
developing anti-gang laws, and building rational budgets and
personnel management systems that reward good
performance. The key in all this is to take a building-block
approach: start with small, basic steps that can form a
foundation for more ambitious measures. USAID has already
begun devoting greater resources to these tasks in Central
America; given additional resources, it may be possible to
improve and expand upon these initiatives.61
Governments must also address the socio-economic
conditions that provide a steady stream of recruits for maras,
pandillas, and other criminal organizations. At the macro
level, this requires implementing policies that increase
investment and stimulate growth. At the micro level, this
means investing in vocational training, education, and afterschool activities that will keep teens and young adults off the
streets and give them some hope of succeeding in a
legitimate line of work. A good example of this latter type
of policy is the USAID community center initiative in
Guatemala, which provides the resources necessary to found
centers where young people can learn a trade, use computers,
and socialize—but only on the condition that municipal
governments, church groups, and private businesses furnish
the physical space and the volunteer labor necessary to
sustain the centers. By operating in this manner, USAID has
brought additional resources to bear on the gang problem and
has helped build partnerships between government and
important groups of citizens.62
If the U.S. is serious about combating criminal fiefdoms, it
must also face up to the reality that much of the money that
funds organized crime in the region comes from U.S. drug
consumption. Since the unveiling of Plan Colombia, the
61
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increasing emphasis on combating drug-related violence
abroad has not been matched by sustained, intensive efforts
to deal with the demand side of the equation. Funding for
domestic demand restriction activities fell as a percentage of
the U.S. counter-drug budget between 2001 and 2008, with
the budget for anti-drug advertising falling by more than half
under the Bush administration. Similarly, while a number of
cities within the U.S. have begun to consider the quasilegalization of marijuana and other harm-reduction
strategies, the national debate on this issue is still relatively
impoverished. Outlining a comprehensive demand-side
strategy is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is clear that
the U.S. will need to devote greater resources, political will,
and creativity to deal with this issue.63
This list of measures should be considered suggestive rather
than definitive or exhaustive. Combating crime, ameliorating
social ills, and correcting institutional decay are far from
exact sciences, and a capacity for innovation and adaptation
will be vital in addressing these issues. To achieve this, a
policy “entrepreneur,” or a creative problem-solver “willing
to experiment with new approaches, to learn from others, and
more important, to abandon initiatives that are not bearing
fruit,” 64 is required if the U.S. seeks to effectively deal with
the problem of AGSs and criminal fiefdoms in Latin
America.
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